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IRS, Inc.-The IRS Oversight Board-Effective
Reform or Just Politics? Some Early Thoughts from
a Corporate Law Perspective
Eric A. Lustig*
During our restructuring process from the public we heard over
and over and over from citizens that, because the IRS has 535
members of its board of directors called the Congress, the IRS is
not Sears and Roebuck, it is created by law.'
I don't believe a Board of Directors is helpful or necessary for the
IRS. We need a responsible commissioner who will do a first rate
job in administering our tax laws. We should hold the commis-
sioner responsible for a first rate job, if he or she fails, we should
get a new one. There is a Board of Directors; it is the Congress.
The IRS is not a corporation without a charter, it has a charter
and it is the Internal Revenue Code, in which Congress directs
what it wishes.2
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. LL.M.,
University of Florida; J.D., University of Miami; M.S., University of Baltimore; B.S., Uni-
versity of Florida. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of Dean John F.
O'Brien and the New England School of Law Judge James R. Lawton Summer Stipend
Program. The author also thanks Barry Stearns, Danielle Maloney, and Kristin McCarthy
for their help in researching this project. Finally, thanks to Richard and Lydia Youngblood
for their helpful comments.
I should add the following. This article is much more fact driven in terms of people
and events than most tax articles are. This results mostly because the events leading up to
and after the formation of the IRS Oversight Board set the stage for the analysis because
the central thesis of the article is that the IRS Oversight Board in both design and practice
is not at all reflective of the Board of Directors form of corporate governance. In addition,
while the article is critical of the creation of and authority granted to IRS Board as a legal
institution, no criticism is intended for the individual members or staff, all of whom appear
to be both professional and dedicated.
1. IRS Oversight: Hearings before the Senate Comm. On Finance, 105 h Cong. 2d Sess.
7 (1998) (statement of Sen. J. Robert Kerrey) (hereinafter '1998 Senate Hearings"). Sena-
tor Kerrey played a key role as chair of the National Commission on Restructuring the IRS.
2. Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearings before the Sen-
ate Comm. On Finance, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. 100 (1997) (statement of former Commis-
sioner of IRS Sheldon Cohen) (hereinafter "1997 Senate Hearings").
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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have long disliked, and even despised, taxes and tax
collectors.3  As the nation's tax collector, the Internal Revenue
Service (hereinafter "IRS") provides an easy target for criticism
because of its long-standing unpopularity with the American tax-
payer.4 Indeed, given its unpopular charge of administering and
enforcing the nation's tax system,5 the IRS is often the lightning
rod for political rhetoric of the forces of change to the tax system.
And the last two decades have yielded a precipitous decline in
public perception of the income tax.6
3. For example, taxes and the tax collector are often described in gory terms. Mark
Twain posed the following: "What is the difference between a taxidermist and a tax collec-
tor? The taxidermist takes only your skin." Jeffery K. Yablon, As Certain as Death-
Quotations About Taxes (Expanded 2000 Edition), 86 TAx NOTES 231, 259 (Jan. 10, 2000).
In a similar vein, humorist Dave Barry sums up the collective feeling of taxpayers on April
15th as follows: "It's income tax time again, Americans: time to gather up those receipts,
get out those tax forms, sharpen up that pencil, and stab yourself in the aorta." Id. at 256.
Of course, taxpayer unhappiness is not limited to Americans, as the Beatles sang in
their song "Tax Man":
If you drive a car, IIl tax the street.
If you try to sit, I'll tax your seat.
If you get too cold, I'll tax the heat.
If you take a walk, IIl tax your feet.
Tax man!
Well, I'm the tax man.
Yeah, I'm the tax man.
Id. at 233.
Perhaps the dislike is innate. A friend of mine, who was reviewing a draft of this
article, mentioned the title to his five-year old, who responded with, "IRS stink" instead of
"IRS, Inc."
4. In a telephone poll of 900 respondents, 51 percent indicated that they would prefer
a root canal to an IRS audit. ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OPINION RESEARCH, QUESTION ID:
USODFOX. 41100 R3 (2000), available in WESTLAW/POLL. The IRS and its agents have
found themselves the butt of many jokes. For example, television comedian David Letter-
man has skewered the IRS in several of his Late Night Show "Top Ten" lists. Examples
include "Hilarious Pranks to Play on the IRS" (April 14, 1999), at
http://www.cbs.comla...teshow/topten/lists/19990414.shmtl; "Ways the IRS Can Improve
It's[sic] Image" (April 1, 1997), at
http://www.cbs.com/la...teshow/topten/lists/19970401.shtml; "IRS Agent Pet Peeves" (April
17, 1995), at http://www.cbs.com/la...teshow/topten/lists/19950417/shtml.
5. One researcher found that "[t]he Internal Revenue Service is frequently cited as the
most hated of all government agencies. This aversion goes well beyond a simple dislike of
paying taxes. Many Americans feel the IRS uses its vast powers capriciously to enforce a
tax code that is unfair and incomprehensible." Daniel J. Mitchell, Income Tax Unfair? Let
me Count the Ways, 80 CONSUMER'S RESEARCH MAG. 24 (May 1997), available in
WESTLAW/MAGAZINE.
6. MICHAEL J. GRAETz, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT iS, How IT GOT THAT WAY, AND
WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 3-9 (rev'd ed. of "The Decline (and Fall?) Of the Income Tax"
1999). Professor Graetz notes that "in 1971 a plurality of Americans considered the federal
income tax the fairest of all taxes used by the various levels of government. . ." Id. at 13.
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Recently, political action appears to have caught up with the po-
litical rhetoric. Congress has pushed the IRS into a sea of change
in terms of strategy and approach in enforcing the tax laws. Gone
is the big stick of enforcing the tax law by audit and fear.' In its
place, the IRS has become a customer-friendly service provider.'
The most recent and significant change came when Congress
passed the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1988.' The Act,
which followed particularly inflammatory hearings,"0 provided a
sweeping overhaul of the Internal Revenue Service. The reform of
the IRS ranged from procedural provisions involving tax contro-
versies, such as the shifting burden of proof" and potentially im-
posing civil damages on IRS for agents' actions, 2 to more struc-
tural changes of the organizational framework of the IRS.'3
As part of the structural changes, Congress created a new IRS
Oversight Board (hereinafter "Oversight Board")," which consists
of nine members including the IRS Commissioner, the Treasury
Secretary and seven outside board members (including one to rep-
resent federal employees).'5 The Oversight Board is generally re-
sponsible for overseeing the operation of the IRS.'6 Indeed, when
the IRS Oversight Board is viewed with other structural changes,
the IRS takes on a decidedly corporate look, at least when one
considers the rhetoric used by reform proponents as well as the
Professor Graetz further notes that the approval has shifted with the majority of people
now believing that the income tax is unfair. Id. at 3-4.
7. One study supports the proposition that a less adversarial role could lead to more
effective results. The Minnesota Department of Revenue conducted a study of various ways
to increase state income tax compliance such as advance notice of audits and better cus-
tomer service. MINN. DEPT. OF REV., THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE
EXPERIMENT STATE TAX RESULTS (1996).
8. Elliott H. Kajan, A Kinder, Gentler IRS, 46 FED. LAW. 36 (1999).
9. IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685
(1998) (hereinafter "Restructuring and Reform Act").
10. The hearings drew public attention by highlighting allegations of abusive practices
by the IRS. The substance of the allegations were later brought into doubt when the Gen-
eral Accounting Office was unable to find evidence supporting the allegations. See infra
text accompanying notes 37-54.
11. See I.R.C. § 7491 (providing limited shifting of burden of proof from taxpayer to the
government).
12. I.R.C. § 7426(h)(1). Section 1203 of the Restructuring and Reform Act has been
labeled as setting forth "10 Deadly Sins' in speciflying] 10 acts of misconduct for which an
IRS employee must be terminated." Ann Murphy and David Higer, The 10 Deadly Sins: A
Law with Unintended Consequences, 96 TAX NOTES 871 (2002). The provisions have been
criticized as yielding the "unintended consequence" of low audit collection rates. Id.
13. Act. Sec. 1001(a)(3).
14. I.R.C. § 7802(a).
15. I.R.C. § 7802(b).
16. I.R.C. § 7802(c)(1).
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statutory terms. This corporateness becomes more pronounced
when viewed with President Clinton's appointment of information
manager Charles Rossotti as IRS Commissioner, a position tradi-
tionally filled by prominent tax lawyers. 17 Mr. Rossotti's appoint-
ment as Commissioner was widely viewed as transforming that
position to a corporate chief executive officer.
This article examines the new IRS Oversight Board as a gov-
ernance device, particularly in light of corporate governance in
the private sector. The article will first trace the history of the
IRS and explore past organizational and governance problems.
Focus will then shift to the reforms enacted in the 1998 IRS Re-
structuring and Reform Act, with particular attention paid to the
structural changes and establishment of the IRS Oversight Board.
The article will then examine the process of seating the initial
board as well as its foray into the 2002 IRS budget battle and the
search for the new IRS Commissioner. The article will review the
IRS Oversight Board from a corporate perspective by examining
the role of directors in governing private corporations. The analy-
sis tests the corporate analogy and considers recent criticisms of
the corporate board model of governance in light of the current
corporate scandals.
This article will conclude that the IRS Oversight Board as a
governance mechanism does not approach the reform suggested by
the political rhetoric and does not significantly improve govern-
ance shortcomings." This article argues that the corporate board
analogy is misplaced. The IRS is not a private corporation. Nor is
it a government corporation. Moreover, the characteristics which
make a private corporation's board of directors effective are not
present. Specifically missing is the plenary power of a corporate
board of directors.
This article ultimately concludes that to the extent that the
creation of the IRS Oversight Board rests on a corporate analogy,
its reform power ends up as ineffective and a failure of tax policy.
17. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Clinton to Tap Info Manager to be Next IRS Commissioner, 75
TAX NOTES 1287 (June 9, 1997); Louis Lyons, Ex-Commissioners: New IRS Chief Needs
Business Savvy, Tax Expertise, 74 TAX NOTES 1250 (Mar. 10, 1997).
18. Indeed, another commentator reached a similar conclusion. Wm. Brian Henning,
Reforming the IRS: The Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 405, 427 (1999) (concluding that the Board's im-
provement of oversight is marginal and fails to significantly increase IRS' accountability to
taxpayers).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the IRS
The history of the IRS traces back to 1862 and the Civil War.
Prior to then taxes were collected by local supervisors, who were
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. 9 In or-
der to meet the fiscal demands of the Civil War, Congress imposed
income and other taxes and created the Office of the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue within the Department of Treasury.0
As tax policy followed the cycle of national events, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue's (hereinafter the "Bureau") role diminished un-
til the 1913 passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in which an in-
come tax was imposed on individuals and corporations." The re-
imposition of the income tax,' as well as the fiscal demand from
the First World War, imposed heavy demand on the Bureau's task
of enforcing the internal revenue laws.'
Even in its early years, (from 1913 to 1951), the Bureau was be-
set by organizational problems.24 Initially, the Bureau was cen-
trally structured with a Washington headquarters and 200 field
offices, which were organized based upon the type of tax, e.g., in-
come, excise, etc.' The Bureau was reorganized in 1953 and re-
named the Internal Revenue Service.26 All positions below the
Commissioner became civil service rather than political. 7  The
1952 reorganization established a three-tier organization: a na-
19. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS RELATING
TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NAT'L COMMISSION ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, S. 1096, AND H.R. 2676 AS PASSED By THE HOUSE (JCS-1-98) 3 (Jan. 23,
1998) (hereinafter "Joint Committee Rep't on Commission's Recommendations").
20. MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1.01 at 1-3, n.1 (2d ed.
1991) (hereinafter "SALTZMAN") (citing 12 Stat. 432). Prior to the enactment of the taxes in
1862, government was financed by other forms of revenue such as import duties and sale of
public lands. Id. See also TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, available at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/aboutIRS/irshistory.html.
21. SALTZMAN, supra note 20, at n.2. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Although an
income tax had been imposed in 1862 to help fund the Civil War, the tax was later attacked
on constitutional grounds as an impermissible direct tax because it was not subject to ap-
portionment. The passage of the Sixteenth Amendment cleared the way constitutionally
for an income tax. 1 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS 1-6, § 1.1.3 (3d ed. 1999).
22. SALTZMAN, supra note 20, at n.2.
23. Id. at § 1.0lat 1-3.
24. Id.
25. Id. at n.3 (citing House Comm. on Ways and Means, King Committee Report, HR
Doc. No 327, 82d Cong., 2d Sess 3 (1952)).
26. Joint Comm. Rep't on Commission's Recommendations, supra note 19, at 3.
27. SALTZMAN at § 1.01, 1-4 (citing Reorg. Plan).
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tional office; nine regional offices; and district offices within each
region.2' The IRS was organized by function, with the operations
within each function decentralized within each region and sub-
sidiary districts."
B. Governance of the IRS
The Commissioner heads the National Office." The Commis-
sioner is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Sen-
ate.31 The Treasury Secretary prescribes the Commissioner's du-
ties and responsibilities. The Commissioner has been delegated
the power and responsibility to administer and enforce the inter-
nal revenue laws.32 At the time of the IRS Restructuring and Re-
form Act of 1998, the Commissioner's office also included the fol-
lowing: Deputy Commissioner; Chief Inspector; Taxpayer Advo-
cate; Chief of Headquarters Operations; Chief Information Officer;
Chief of Management & Administration; Chief Operations Officer;
and Chief Financial Officer.33 The Executive Committee served as
the IRS' principal decision and policy maker.' Additional inter-
nal groups included the IRS Investment View Board and the Sen-
ior Council for Management Controls.' The Advisory Group to
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue (hereinafter "CAG")
provided private sector advice to the Commissioner.36
C. Past Problems
The IRS and its predecessor bureau have long been associated
with political abuse.37 In addition, the IRS has been painted as
28. Joint Committee Rep't on Commission's Recommendations, supra note 19, at 2.
29. Id. at 3. The IRS's functions include: customer service; forms processing; examina-
tion; collection; and criminal investigation. Id.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 5 (citing I.R.C. § 7802(a)).
32. Id. at 6 (citing T.D.O. No. 150-10 and Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689).
33. Joint Committee Rep't on Commission's Recommendations, supra note 19, at 4.
34. Id. at 4-5. The following individuals constitute the Executive Committee: the
Commissioner; Deputy Commissioner; Chief of Staff; Chief of Taxpayer Service; Chief
Compliance Officer; Chief of Management & Administration; Chief Financial Officer; Chief
Information Officer; Taxpayer Advocate; Chief Inspector; Chief Counsel; National Director
of Appeals; Executive Officer for Service Center Operations; the four Regional Counsels;
and the National President of the National Treasury Employees Union. Id. at n.ll.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id. at 5.
37. The history of the IRS has largely been profiled in two books published in the popu-
lar press. DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF-THE IRS AND THE ABUSE OF POWER
(1989); SHELLEY L. DAVIS. UNBRIDLED POWER (1997).
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being managed within a closed culture of secrecy and abuse, of
both taxpayers and employees.38 These problems yielded the per-
ception of an omnipotent, yet hugely inefficient, government bu-
reaucracy.
Allegations of political abuse by the IRS and its predecessor
agency date back to the Hoover administration and go up to the
Clinton administration. In the midst of the Depression in 1931,
the Navy League, a conservative group of arms executives, retired
naval officers, and others strongly criticized President Hoover's
budget cuts made to the country's shipbuilding program. 39 The
Navy League's criticisms of President Hoover cut deep with the
President.40  Although there was no indication that federal laws
were broken, the Hoover White House launched an investigation
into the Navy League.4' As part of its investigation, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter "FBI") and its young director,
J. Edgar Hoover, attempted to obtain membership information
through federal tax records.42 Although the FBI was unsuccessful
in its efforts, its secret examination was not illegal as the presi-
43dent was allowed at that time to inspect tax records for any use.
Indeed, the ability of the president to use tax records continued
until the Watergate scandal of the 1970's and the ensuing reforms
and served as the source of much of the perceived political abuse
by the IRS and its predecessor agency."
Allegations of political abuse continued over time. President
Franklin Roosevelt's administration allegedly attempted to bring
criminal tax charges against former Treasury Secretary Andrew
Mellon, a political enemy of the president.45 The Roosevelt ad-
ministration also reportedly used a tax investigation against Lou-
isiana Governor Huey Long, another political enemy of the presi-
dent."6 The investigation ended soon after Long's assassination. 7
Other instances of gathering tax information on political foes also
38. See DAVIS, supra note 37.
39. BURNHAM, supra note 37, at 226; see also supra text accompanying note 37.
40. Id. The criticism labeled President Hoover "abysmal[ly] ignoran[t]" about world
affairs and as engaging in "almost traitorous" activity with the British prime minister. Id.
at 226-27.
41. Id. at 227.
42. Id. at 228.
43. Id.
44. BURNHAM, supra note 37, at 228.
45. Id. at 229-30.
46. Id. at 231-34.
47. Id. at 234.
IRS, Inc.
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were reported.48 In addition, Eleanor Roosevelt reportedly initi-
ated an investigation of conservative newspaper publisher Frank
Gannett, a harsh critic of the Roosevelt administration.49 The in-
vestigation centered on the tax-exempt status of Cornell Univer-
sity, with which Gannett had financial dealings and on whose
board of governors Mr. Gannett sat."
Perhaps the greatest alleged political abuse was during the
Nixon administration:
Our public memory tells us that the IRS sat at Richard
Nixon's knee, auditing his enemies and going easy on his
friends. Our public memory tells us that these shenanigans
continued until White House counsel John Dean gave the
country a shocking wake-up call with his testimony before the
Senate Watergate Committee in mid-1973, which preceded by
barely a year Nixon's abdication from the throne and dis-
grace."
The Special Services Staff was a covert IRS operation that was
originally formed to go after dissident groups such as the Black
Panthers rather than the Nixon enemies list. 2 The Special Ser-
vices Staff was later disbanded by IRS Commissioner Donald
Alexander."
Political scandals continued. More recently, the IRS' investiga-
tion of the travel agency involved in the "Travelgate" scandal dur-
ing the Clinton administration was brought into question.'
III. STUDY AND REFORM
A. National Commission on Restructuring the IRS
Over time, the IRS had developed a reputation as an inefficient
and unaccountable organization. In response to concerns about
the state of the IRS, Congress passed a statute creating the Na-
tional Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service
48. Id. at 235-36.
49. BURNHAM, supra note 37, at 236-38.
50. Id. at 236.
51. DAVIS, supra note 37, at 80-81.
52. Id. at 82-84.
53. Id. at 95.
54. Lee A. Sheppard, Was the IRS Involved in Travelgate?, 59 TAx NOTES 1301 (June 7,
1993).
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(hereinafter the "Commission").55 Congress based its concern on
findings that IRS' Tax Systems Modernization (hereinafter "TSM")
efforts had been too expensive and inefficient.' Accordingly, Con-
gress formed the Commission "to examine the organization of the
IRS and recommend actions to expedite the implementation of
TSM and improve service to taxpayers.5
The bipartisan Commission was chaired by Democratic Senator
Robert Kerrey and Republican Congressman Rob Portman."5 The
Commission conducted extensive public hearings and private
meetings with citizens, government officials, academics, tax pro-
fessionals, and business representatives.
A majority of the Commission approved a host of recommenda-
tions.59 One of the central recommendations was that "Congress
should create an independent Board of Directors to oversee the
IRS within the Department of Treasury." ° The majority based its
recommendation on the following reasons and concerns. First, the
Treasury Department had generally limited its role with respect
to the IRS to tax policy and major problems.' This was based in
part on keeping the IRS an independent agency amid earlier alle-
gations of its politicization during the 1960's and 1970's.6" Thus,
the Treasury Department provided little oversight. In addition,
55. P.L. 104-52, 110 STAT. 509 (1995), as amended by P.L. 104-34, 110 STAT. 132 § 2904
(1996) and P.L. 104-208, 110 STAT. 3009 § 643 (1996).
56. Id. at § 637(a).
57. Id. at § 637(b).
58. NAT'L COMM. ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REPORT OF THE
NAT'L COMMN ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 4 (1997) (hereinafter
"National Restructuring Commission Report"), available at
http'//www.house.gov/natcommirs/main.htm. The Commission's other sixteen members
were as follows: Democratic Congressman William J. Coyne (replaced in January 1997 by
Congressman Robert T. Matsui); Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr., Chairman California State
Board of Equalization; Fred T. Goldberg, Jr, (a former IRS Commissioner) law firm of
Skadden, Arps et. al; Republican Senator Charles E. Grassley; Gerry Harkins, Southern
Pan Services Co.; Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary (Communications & Information), U.S.
Department of Commerce; David Keating, National Taxpayers Union; Edward S. Knight,
General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department; J. Fred Kubik, Baird, Kurtz & Dobson; Mark
McConaghy, Price Waterhouse; George Newstrom, Electronic Data Systems; Grover
Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform; Robert Tobias, President, National Treasury Employ-
ees Union; Josh S. Weston, Automated Data Processing; James W. Wetzler, Deloitte &
Touche; and Margaret Milner Richardson, IRS Commissioner.
59. Id. at 7. The majority was comprised of Senator Kerrey, Mr. Dronenburg, Mr.
Goldberg, Senator Grassley, Mr. Harkins, Mr. Keating, Congressman Portman, Mr. Kubik,
Mr. McConaghy, Mr. Norquist, Mr. Tobias, and Mr. Weston.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id.
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the IRS received little strategic guidance from Treasury.63 Indeed,
any proffered guidance was "limited and chaotic." 4 Finally, more
response was needed to the problem of systems modernization.'
The majority recommended a seven-person board made up of
the Treasury Secretary (or deputy), National Treasury Employees
Union representative, and five private life members.66 The private
life members were to be appropriately compensated and serve
staggered five year terms.67 Additionally, the majority recom-
mended that:
It is critical that the members from the private life be high
stature, nonpartisan professionals, with expertise particularly
relevant to a 100,000 employee organization. These individu-
als collectively will bring to bear expertise in the following ar-
eas: (1) management of large service organizations, (2) cus-
tomer service, information technology, (4) organization devel-
opment, and (5) the needs and concerns of taxpayers.68
The Commission majority recommended that Congress enumer-
ate the board's power to review and approve various actions of the
IRS Commissioner's decisions on planning and budgeting as well
as to review the IRS Commissioner's compensation and the com-
pensation of senior IRS executives.69
A number of Commission members expressed separate concur-
ring and dissenting views on the establishment of the IRS Board
of Directors. Congressman Coyne agreed with the need for addi-
tional oversight and accountability but disagreed that it be
through a private sector board of directors: "I have reservations
about the Commission's recommendation to allow individual tax-
payers from the private sector to have final decision-making au-
thority over the IRS administration of the tax laws, including the
appointment of the IRS Commissioner."" Moreover, Congressman
Coyne expressed concern as to whether oversight authority could
be adequately separated from tax policy.7' As an alternative, Con-





68. National Restructuring Commission Report, supra note 58, at 12.
69. Id. at 14.
70. Id. at 62.
71. Id.
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gressman Coyne advanced a private sector advisory board, as then
planned by the Clinton administration."
Mr. Dronenberg, who voted with the majority, added that the
IRS should be entirely removed from the Treasury in order to be
completely independent.73
Mr. Irving declined to join the majority's report, citing dis-
agreement with granting governance to an outside board of direc-
tors:
The Board's power ultimately could extend beyond govern-
ance issues to tax policy, law enforcement, and day-to-day
management. The line being drawn between oversight and
tax policy and management will, in my opinion, be almost im-
possible to police or maintain, and ultimately will raise seri-
ous accountability and jurisdictional questions. After four
years of heading a federal government agency, I have experi-
enced the complexities of shared jurisdiction and accountabil-
ity and the thin line between oversight and management.74
Mr. Knight, Mr. Irving, and Mr. Wetzler joined together for a
separate report which disagreed with a number of the Commis-
sion's recommendations, including the IRS Board of Directors.
The core of their opposition also rested on the use of a board
drawn from the private sector:
We believe the proposed board structure, the majority's rec-
ommended instrument of change, would be ineffective, would
violate basic principles of our democracy, and would delay and
even derail efforts to improve the agency.
* **
There is little argument that in most cases boards work in the
private sector. Private sector boards have shareholders, di-
rector's liability, and the discipline of the marketplace to keep
them in check and hold them accountable. But the IRS board
recommended by the majority would have none of these pri-
vate sector incentives or protections. The IRS is not and can-
not be an entity that succeeds or fails based on its market per-
72. Id.
73. National Restructuring Commission Report, supra note 58, at 65.
74. Id. at 67.
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formance. It performs one of the most essential functions of
our government, upon which all others depend. 5
The dissenting members cited a General Accounting Office
(hereinafter "GAO") report to further support that the board was
not an appropriate model for running an agency as large as the
IRS."6 In addition, the dissenters contended that full-time IRS
oversight was needed rather than part-time. Moreover, conflicts
of interest would be inherent between individual board members
and the IRS. Of final concern among the dissenters was the pos-
sibility that the majority's recommendations violated constitu-
tional provisions.
B. IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
1. Hearings and Calls for Reform
In 1997 and 1998, the Senate convened a series of hearings to
examine the IRS." The IRS was generally portrayed as an unac-
countable purveyor of fear:
There is no doubt that the powers of the Internal Revenue
Service are extraordinary. The IRS can seize property, pay-
checks, and even the residences of the people it serves. Busi-
nesses can be padlocked, sometimes causing hundreds of em-
ployees who are also taxpayers to be put out of work.
Unfortunately our investigation today has found that in many
cases such high standards are not being upheld. Over the
course of [these hearings] we are going to see a picture of a
troubled agency, one that is losing the confidence of the
75. Id. at 77.
76. Id. at 77. The dissenters appear to refer to GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL COMMIIEE ON AGING, U.S. SENATE: SOCIAL SECURITY
LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE FOR AN INDEPENDENT SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
(GAO/hRD-89-154 (1989)).
77. 1997 Senate Hearings, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Mismanagement and Ideas for Improvement: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Gov-
ernment, Management, Information and Technology of the'Comm. on Government Reform
and Oversight of the House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.(1997); 1998 Senate
Hearings, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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American people, and one that all too frequently acts as if it
were above the law. This is unacceptable. 8
The hearings produced taxpayers who testified to improper and
abusive IRS audits and collections. In addition, some IRS employ-
ees also testified as to the pressure placed on them to meet collec-
tion quotas. Moreover, testimony suggested an inefficient agency
with an entrenched level of senior management with no account-
ability. Doubt was later raised as the accuracy of the allegations
of IRS abuse were subsequently discredited when the GAO re-
ported that it was unable to find evidence supporting the allega-
tions. 79 The GAO report was not made public by the Senate Fi-
nance Committee because the report purportedly contained confi-
dential taxpayer information protected under IRC § 6103.80
Pulitzer Prize winning New York Times investigative reporter
David Cay Johnston recently described the setting of the hearings
as follows:
Behind the [black] curtains sat six IRS employees, identified
only by numbers. All had their voices electronically distorted, the
way turncoat mobsters who feared their godfathers would have
them whacked were allowed to testify. At a time when some
members of Congress were describing government law enforce-
ment agents as "jack booted thugs," the impression that the IRS
was a government Mafia that could have you killed for breaking
its code of silence was unmistakable.
It was great drama. ... Over six days in the fall and spring
television networks and newspapers gave mostly breathless ac-
counts of a rogue agency ruining lives with abandon until [Senate
Finance Committee Chair] Roth came to the rescue."
More importantly, Johnston noted that the substance of the
hearings was largely unsupported or false:
There was one problem. Most of [the testimony referenced
above] wasn't true. But that would not come out for months
and when an official inquiry that Roth ordered from .. .the
78. 1997 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of the Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee William Roth).
79. GENERAL ACCT. OFF., GAO/OSI-99-9R (1999), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr.
25, 2000), available in WESTLAW 2000 TNT 80.13 (report obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act (hereinafter "FOIA")).
80. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Secret GAO Report is Latest to Discredit Roth's IRS Hearings,
TAX NOTES TODAY 79-1 (Apr. 21, 2000).
81. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL 145-46 (2003).
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General Accounting Office . . . found little to support what
had been presented at the hearings, [Senator Roth] did his
best to make sure the public would never see the full report.
Thus, there was significant disagreement whether the hearings
accurately described problems at the IRS as much as they re-
flected its political vulnerability.
2. The IRS Oversight Board
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 reshaped the
IRS with a number of structural provisions. 3 In enacting the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Congress adopted, with
little deviation, the Restructuring Commission's IRS board of di-
rectors recommendation.
a. Power and Responsibility
The focus of this article is on the establishment of the Internal
Revenue Service Oversight Board.85 The Oversight Board's re-
sponsibilities generally include overseeing the IRS' administration
of the tax laws, 6 as well as ensuring that the IRS carries out its
mission." Additionally, Congress charged the Board with specific
responsibilities to provide input and review in the areas of strate-
gic plans, operational plans, management, and taxpayer protec-
tion.88 The specific charges can be viewed as falling within four
82. Id. at 146.
83. The Act also contained numerous other provisions including shifting the burden of
proof to the IRS in certain cases, as well as imposing personal liability on certain IRS per-
sonnel who violate certain provisions.
84. "I think [Congress] got it 90 percent right .... That's well above average. I'm
happy with it." Amy Hamilton, How True is Congress to the Vision for a New IRS, 79 TAX
NOTES 1208 (1998) (quoting Commission Co-chair Senator Robert Kerrey). Representative
Rob Portman echoed his co-chair's comments: "My view is it is remarkably faithful to the
commission's general approach-and even on specifics . . . This in all major respects is
faithful to the commission's report, so I'm very pleased." Id.
85. I.R.C. § 7802(a).
86. IRC § 7802(c)(1)(A) ("The Oversight Board shall oversee the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice in its administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execu-
tion and application of the internal revenue laws or related statutes and tax conventions to
which the United States is a party.").
87. I.R.C. at § 7802(c)(1)(B). The IRS Restructuring Act required the IRS to restate its
mission statement. Act Sec. 1002. The currently revised mission statement is as follows:
Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and meet
their tax responsibilities by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/welcome/mission.html.
88. I.R.C. § 7802(d). The Board's specific duties are as follows:
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broad functions. First, the Board oversees long-range operational
and strategic planning. This includes reviewing the overall direc-
tion of the agency as well as making sure that such direction fol-
lows the mission statement. Second, the Board has direct over-
sight over budgetary matters. The Board reviews and approves
the IRS budget and presents it to the Treasury Secretary." The
Board also oversees senior management of the IRS, with the spe-
cific power to recommend to the President candidates for ap-
pointment as IRS Commissioner, as well as to recommend the re-
moval of the Commissioner. ° Finally, the Board is charged with
ensuring the proper treatment of taxpayers by the IRS.9"
Notwithstanding its seemingly broad charges of responsibility,
the Oversight Board is specifically precluded from authority with
respect to direct tax policy or administration." Thus, the Board is
(1) STRATEGIC PLANS. To review and approve strategic plans of the Internal Revenue
Service, including-
(A) missions and objectives, and standards of performance relative to either;
and
(B) annual and long-range strategic plans.
(2) OPERATIONAL PLANS. To review the operational functions of the Internal Revenue
Service, including:
(A) plans for the modernization of the tax system;
(B) plans for outsourcing or managed competition; and
(C) plans for training and education.
(3) MANAGEMENT. To:
(A) recommend to the President candidates for appointment as the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue and recommend to the President the removal of the
Commissioner;
(B) review the Commissioner's selection, evaluation, and compensation of In-
ternal Revenue Service senior executives who have program management re-
sponsibility over significant functions of the Internal Revenue Service; and
(C) review and approve the Commissioner's plans for any major reorganization
of the Internal Revenue Service.
(4) BUDGET. To:
(A) review and approve the budget request of the Internal Revenue Service
prepared by the Commissioner;
(B) submit such budget request to the Secretary of Treasury; and
(C) ensure that the budget request supports the annual and long-range strate-
gic plans.
(5) TAxPAYER PROTECTION. To ensure the proper treatment of taxpayers by the em-
ployees of the Internal Revenue Service.
Id.
89. I.R.C. at § 7802(d)(4)(A) and (B)
90. I.R.C. at § 7802(d)(3).
91. I.R.C. at § 7802(d)(5).
92. I.R.C. at § 7802(c)(2). The following are specifically carved out from the Oversight
Board's authority and responsibility:
EXCEPTIONS. The Oversight Board shall have no responsibilities or authority with re-
spect to:
Duquesne Law Review
without responsibility or authority on the development of tax pol-
icy, as well as any involvement with law enforcement or compli-
ance activities.93
b. Membership
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 set forth a nine-
member board comprised of six outside members,' the Secretary
of Treasury or Deputy Secretary,9" the Commissioner of the IRS,96
and one member who is a full-time federal employee (or represen-
tative of employees), for a total of seven appointed private board
members and two ex officio.97 The outside members and the em-
ployees' representative are nominated by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.9"
The members of the Oversight Board are to be nonpartisan and
nominated based upon experience in the following areas:
(i) management of large service organizations;
(ii) customer service;




(vi) the needs and concerns of taxpayers; [and]
(A) the development and formulation of Federal tax policy relating to existing
or proposed internal revenue laws, related statutes, and tax conventions;
(B) specific law enforcement activities of the Internal Revenue Service, includ-
ing specific compliance activities such as examinations, collection activities,
and criminal investigations;
(C) specific procurement activities of the Internal Revenue Service; or




94. I.R.C. § 7802(b)(1)(A) ("Six members shall be individuals who are not otherwise
Federal Officers or employees and who are appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.").
95. I.R.C. § 7802(b)(1)(B).
96. I.R.C. § 7802(b)(1)(C).
97. I.R.C. § 7802(b)(1)(D).
98. I.R.C. § 7802(b)(1)(A) and (D).
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(vii) The needs and concerns of small businesses.99
The Act sets forth a staggered board in which the initial outside
and employee directors are appointed for three to five year
terms."° The effect of this initial staggered board followed by full
five-year terms is a perpetually staggered outside board; two new
outside members will be appointed three years from the installa-
tion of the initial board. Outside and employee board members
are limited to two, five-year terms.' Outside and employee board
members are also treated as governmental officers or employees
for ethical and financial disclosure purposes under the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978.102
IV. FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY-GETTING THE IRS OVERSIGHT
BOARD OFF THE GROUND
A. Seating the Board
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 required that
the President present his board nominees to the Senate by Janu-
ary 22, 1999, six months after President Clinton signed the act
into law.0 3 It was not until over two years after the act was signed
that the IRS Oversight Board was finally sworn in and convened
its first meeting in November 2000.1°4 The path from the passage
of the act to the Board's first meeting proved to be a painfully slow
and rocky one.' 5 Indeed, some wondered whether the Board
would ever be organized: "The Concept of the IRS Oversight
Board, ironically, is now dangerously close to morphing into one of
those figments of the imagination that gets sucked into the black
hole of forgotten history without anyone noticing."
10 6
A combination of forces contributed to the delay in seating the
Board. Initially, the Clinton administration took considerable
99. I.R.C. § 7802(b)(2)(A).
100. I.R.C. § 7802(b)(2)(B).
101. I.R.C. at § 7802(b)(2)(C).
102. I.R.C. at § 7802(b)(3)(A).
103. Act. Sec. 1102(d).
104. George Guttman, IRS Oversight Board Holds "First" Meeting in Atlanta, 83 TAX
NoTES 995 (2000).
105. Canada also endured a similar rocky start with its recently created board of man-
agement for its Department of National Revenue. Robert Goulder, U.S. and Canadian Tax
Oversight Boards Suffer Rocky Starts, 84 TAX NOTES 520 (July 26, 1999).




time to finalize its appointments (until the end of 1999). Next,
Senate Republicans contested some of the prospective nominees,
thus stretching out the process. Finally, when the administration
finally made its nominations, there was a further delay as political
horse-trading ensued.
The Clinton administration's delay may have been a manifesta-
tion of its opposition to the concept of the Board. °7 Although the
administration, through the Treasury Department, claimed to be
deeply engaged in selecting nominees, °8 the January 22, 1999
deadline came and went without the required nominations. 9
With the Clinton administration's increasing tardiness came
building public pressure to name the Board."0. Moreover, the de-
lay in naming the Board affected other reform measures such as
the initial annual meeting (required by June 1, 1999)"' for a joint
session of the six congressional committees with jurisdiction over
tax.
1 1 2
Other factors contributed to the delay. The White House and
Treasury Department found it more difficult than expected to find
strong candidates for their dream team. As one commentator
noted, "Treasury was not seeking the ususal suspects-and has
been turned down on more than one occasion by a person who
107. One commentator noted then Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin's vehement oppo-
sition to the creation of the Board. Id. (reporting a rift between Secretary Rubin and Na-
tional Commission on Restructuring the IRS co-Chair Senator J. Robert Kerrey); see also
Christopher Bergin, Looking for Leadership in all the Wrong Places, 85 TAX NOTES 269
(1999).
108. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Treasury Working on List of IRS Oversight Board Candidates,
80 TAX NOTES 882 (1998) (noting that Treasury and IRS Commissioner Rossotti "have been
working since before the IRS reform bill creating the law became law July 22 to find the
best and brightest candidates for the panel.... It's like we're putting a dream team list
together.").
109. Amy Hamilton, Clinton Prepares to Name Nominees to IRS Oversight Board, 82
TAX NOTES 436 (1999) (reporting that the White House's short list for the six private life
members was only one name short).
110. Amy Hamilton, Clinton Chided Again for Tardy IRS Oversight Board Nominations,
83 TAX NOTES 359 (1999) (citing National Taxpayer's Union (hereinafter "NTU") (letter to
President Clinton chiding the administration for its tardiness when taxpayers who are late
filing tax returns are subject to penalties); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Missed Collections Prime
Issue for Overdue IRS Board, Tax Writer's Say, 85 TAX NOTES 275 (1999) (citing published
critical comments by National Commission on Restructuring the IRS co-chairs Senator
Kerrey and Representative Portman).




failed to see the allure of linking his or her reputation to that of
the IRS.""3
By May 1999, the administration finally had assembled most of
its choices for the Board appointments, which it then leaked to the
media."4 On May 12, 1999, the Wall Street Journal published the
five prospective nominees: James W. Wetzler, Robert Tobias,
Steve Nickles, Karen Hastie Williams, and Larry R. Levitan."5
Mr. Tobias was the prospective nominee designated to represent
the IRS employees while the others were for four of the six private
life slots."6
Mr. Wetzler was a director in the consulting firm of Deloitte &
Touche LLP and a former New York Commissioner of Taxation
and Finance." ' He also served as a member of the National Com-
mission on Restructuring the IRS, where he was a strong oppo-
nent of the concept of an IRS Oversight Board."8
Mr. Nickles is a Wake Forest University law professor who spe-
cializes in bankruptcy and commercial law."9 He had also served
as a special assistant in the Arkansas Governor's office during Bill
Clinton's tenure as Arkansas Attorney General.' 6
Ms. Williams is a government contracts lawyer with the law
firm of Crowel & Moring.' 2' She had also served in the admini-
stration of President Jimmy Carter and as a chief counsel for the
Senate Budget Committee.
Mr. Levitan is a retired computer services consultant with An-
dersen Consulting.'23 He had also served as a part-time advisor on
technology to IRS Commissioner Rossotti.1
24
Mr. Tobias was the president of the National Treasury Em-
ployee's Union (hereinafter "NTEU").125 He had also served on the
National Commission on Restructuring the IRS.'26 In February
113. Amy Hamilton, Will Clinton's Legacy Include an IRS Oversight Board?, 84 TAX
NOTES 1237 (noting that two candidates had failed the background test).
114. Amy Hamilton & Ryan J. Donmoyer, Clinton Administration Leaks Names of Some
IRS Board Nominees, 83 TAX NOTES 935.
115. Tom Herman, Tax Report (Weekly Column), WALL ST. J., May 12, 1999, at Al.










126. Hamilton & Donmoyer, supra note 114, at 935.
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1999, Mr. Tobias announced that he would not seek reelection as
president of the NTEU in order to avoid a potential conflict of in-
terest issue raised by Senate Finance Committee Republicans.'27
Although the initial reaction to the leaked names was encourag-
ing,12 Senate Finance Committee Republicans soon criticized the
choice of Messrs. Wetzler and Nickles. In a letter and press re-
lease of May 31, 1999, all eleven Senate Finance Committee Re-
publicans voiced their displeasure about two unnamed candi-
dates.129  A similar letter was sent by Senators Roth, Grassley,
and Chaffee. 13  While not specifically identified, the criticism
clearly addressed Mr. Wetzler and Mr. Nickles.' Criticism of Mr.
Wetzler centered on his opposition to the creation of the IRS Over-
sight Board while serving on the National Commission of Restruc-
turing the IRS. As to Mr. Nickles, the Finance Committee Repub-
licans questioned whether his background as a bankruptcy expert
fell within the statutory requirements. In addition, the senators
questioned whether Mr. Nickles' appointment was truly non-
partisan. Furthermore, some senators reportedly were disap-
pointed with the overall quality of the prospective appointments.
In June 1999, Mr. Wetzler withdrew his name from considera-
tion, citing the "low probability that the Senate was going to con-
sent to [his] nomination."1 2 Mr. Wetzler's withdrawal left the ad-
ministration three names short, which prompted additional con-
cern from Senator Kerrey 33
In August 1999, the White House nominated George L. Farr to
the Board."M Mr. Farr, the former vice-chairman of American Ex-
press, was targeted as meeting the requirement for "organiza-
tional development, and management of a large corporation."2 5
Prior to Mr. Farr's position with American Express, he was a sen-
127. Ryan J. Donmoyer & Amy Hamilton, Tobias Retirement Could Ease Confirmation
as IRS Board Member, 82 TAX NOTES 1093 (February 17, 1999).
128. Id.
129. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Finance Committee Republicans Flag Two IRS Board Can-
didates, 83 TAX NOTES 1274 (1999).
130. Roth, Finance Members Write Clinton on IRS Oversight Nominees, 83 TAX NOTES
1453 (1999).
131. Ryan J. Donmoyer, supra note 129, at 1274.
132. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Wetzler Withdraws His Name from Consideration for IRS
Board, 83 TAx NOTES 1666 (June 21, 1999).
133. Id. ("The White House is 'dangerously close' to skirting its statutory responsibil-
ity.").
134. Amy Hamilton, Clinton Eye's American Express Official for IRS Oversight Board,




ior partner at McKinsey and Co., where he dealt with clients' stra-
tegic and operational issues." Mr. Farr's responsibilities at
American Express included overall management of the organiza-
tion and making strategic operating decisions. 37
In October 1999, President Clinton nominated Charles L. Kolbe
to the Board.'8 Mr. Kolbe, a cattle rancher, was a director on the
board of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, which repre-
sents, and lobbies on behalf of, one million cattle farms and
ranches.'39 Mr. Kolbe's resume includes membership on the Na-
tional Livestock and Meat Board." ° President Clinton reportedly
nominated Mr. Kolbe on the recommendation of Republican Sena-
tor Charles Grassley, a member of the Finance Committee.'
With Mr. Kolbe's nomination, the administration had one more
appointment to make. The administration promised to announce
the final nominee quickly, which it did.'42 In November 1999, an
IRS source reported that Nancy Killefer would be nominated to
the final seat on the Board.'43 Ms. Killefer was the Assistant Sec-
retary for Management and Chief Financial Officer for the Treas-
ury.'" At the time, Ms. Killefer was reportedly leaving Treasury
to return to the consulting firm of McKinsey & Co.'45 Ms. Killefer,
a strong proponent of systems modernization and a customer ser-
vice approach for the IRS, had been actively involved with Treas-
ury's input on other Board nominees.'46
President Clinton's final nominee, Ms. Killefer, was named in
November 1999, ten months after the date required by statute and
well after one year from the enactment of the IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998. While the White House clearly dragged
its heels, the Senate did not do much better as the nominees lan-
guished for many months awaiting Senate confirmation.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Amy Hamilton, Clinton Nominates Cattle Rancher to IRS Oversight Board, 85 TAX
NOTES 415 (Oct. 25, 1999).
139. Id. (noting that the association lobbies for tax issues including lowering capital
gains rates and repealing the estate tax).
140. Id.
141. Id. Senator Grassley called Mr. Kolbe "an expert on the needs and concerns of
small businesses, and his perspective will be a tremendous asset to the board." Id.
142. Barton Massey, White House Will Act Quickly on Last Nominee for IRS Board,
Official Says, 85 TAx NOTES 564 (Nov. 1, 1999)







The Senate decided to confirm all of the nominees at one time. 47
According to Senator Grassley's office, a hold on the confirmation
of Mr. Kolbe was holding up confirmation for the entire Board.
Although the details and identity of the senator (or senators) plac-
ing a hold are not required to be disclosed, it was reported that the
hold was placed by a Democratic senator who was not a member of
the Finance Committee.149 It also appeared that the unidentified
senator(s)'s hold on Mr. Kolbe's nomination was in response to
Senator Grassley's hold on two State Department nominations.'5"
Senator Grassley's holds were to pressure the administration to
help a whistle blower at the United Nations negotiate with the
State Department."' Interestingly, first lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton became involved in this political gridlock:
While traveling in Eastern Europe [in the fall of 19991, the first
lady visited the Slovak Republic. While there, she phoned
Grassley and asked him to stop holding up the nomination ... for
the U.S. Ambassador to Slovokia. Grassley replied he would not
lift his hold on [the] nomination-and on two more State Depart-
ment nominations-until he received a commitment that the
White House would intervene to help a whistle blower, who
worked at the United Nations, reopen 'good faith negotiations'
with the State Department."'
There was still no action by the Senate as of June 2000 when
Senate Finance Chair William Roth and ranking Democrat Sena-
tor Moynihan formally asked Majority Leader Trent Lott to help
gain confirmation for the Board." In late July 2000, just prior to
the Senate recess, Senator Grassley lifted his hold on the two am-
bassadorial nominations." The Senate Minority Leader's office
then suggested that the unnamed Democratic senator's hold on
147. Amy Hamilton, Grassley's Nominee Singled Out in IRS Oversight Board Hold Up,
2000 TAx NOTES 52-3 (March 16, 2000).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Senator Grassley's hold was on the nominees for the U.S. Ambassador to Slova-
kia and to the Philippines. It was further reported that Senator Grassley did not believe
that the holds were related. Amy Hamilton, Political Showdown Led to Hold on IRS Over-
sight Board Nominee, 2000 TAx NOTES 62-5 (March 30, 2000).
151. Id.
152. Hamilton, supra note 148, at 52-3.
153. Roth, Moynihan Ask for Senate Leader's Help in IRS Oversight Board Confirma-
tion, 87 TAX NOTES 1757 (June 26, 2000).
154. Amy Hamilton, Grassley Removes One Obstacle to IRS Oversight Board, 88 TAX
NOTES 722 (Aug. 1, 2000).
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Mr. Kolbe would be lifted." In September 2000, almost one year
after President Clinton's nominees were finalized and over two
years after the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 was
enacted, the Senate finally confirmed President Clinton's seven
nominees: Mr. Farr, Ms. Killefer, Mr. Kolbe, Mr. Levitan, Mr.
Nickles, Mr. Tobias, and Ms. Williams.'
B. The Board Enters the Fray
On September 29, 2000, the IRS Oversight Board was sworn in
during a ceremony at the Treasury Department.'57 The Board
then elected Mr. Levitan as chairman.'58 Mr. Levitan, a retired
consultant, was thought to be able and willing to devote signifi-
cant time to the Board.'59 In addition, Mr. Levitan already had
served as a part-time consultant to Commissioner Rossotti and
had spent time meeting with key legislators and other important
contacts. 1
60
The IRS Oversight Board held its inaugural meeting in Novem-
ber 2000.161 The closed meeting broke out into the three subcom-
mittees: modernization (Ms. Killefer, Ms. Williams and Mr. Levi-
tan); personnel and organization (Mr. Farr, Mr. Kolbe and Mr.
Nickles); and performance management (Mr. Tobias, Mr. Nickles
and Ms. Williams).162 IRS senior executives then briefed the sub-
committees. The Board then reconvened and discussed the IRS
2001 budget, which had not yet been adopted.'63 The Board was
also briefed on Blue Print 2000, the IRS' current modernization
plan.'" The Board then met with various IRS managers and
staff. 65
The first test for the IRS Oversight Board came with the fiscal
year 2002 budget for the IRS. The IRS initially proposed $9.8 bil-
lion in its proposed 2002 budget submitted to the Office of Man-
155. Id.
156. Heidi Glenn, Two Years Later: Senate Approves IRS Oversight Board, 88 TAX
NOTES 1289 (Sept. 8, 2000).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 596.
160. Id.
161. George Guttman, The New IRS Oversight Board Holds "First" Meeting in Atlanta,
89 TAX NOTES 995 (Nov. 20, 2000).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 996.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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agement and Budget (hereinafter "OMB"). 166 After review, OMB
approved $9.4 billion, which was an 8 percent increase over the
IRS' $8.7 billion 2001 budget. 167 The Bush administration de-
fended its cuts as a matter of priority and overall philosophy:
The smaller increase should not be viewed as a lack of sup-
port for the IRS, which is currently going through a massive
reorganization and modernization effort. Funding decisions
were made to advance the president's plan to provide more
money for education and defense programs .... The admini-
stration was also concerned that the overall growth in funding
for government programs was too high. Many of the cuts re-
flect the OMB's philosophy on funding government costs and
services, rather than any bias against the IRS.'6
The budget costs affected modernization and personnel.169 The
IRS requested $450 million for modernization and OMB author-
ized $325 million, resulting in a $125 million cut.7 ° In addition,
$140 million requested for extra funding for the current IRS labor
force was rejected as well as $100 million funding for hiring addi-
tional staff under the Staffing Tax Administration for Balance and
Equity program (hereinafter "STABLE"). 7'
The IRS Oversight Board met two days before the administra-
tion released its budget blueprint and voted for a total IRS budget
of $10.26 million.172 The vote was 6-0 with Commissioner Rossotti
not voting.'73 The Board was particularly concerned that the
"piecemeal funding of modernization" would make it less likely to
succeed.'74
The difference between the IRS' request, the Board's request,
and the administration's budget led to a political showdown.
Board Chair Larry Levitan stated, "We intend to communicate our
message as loudly as possible, as frequently as possible ... Con-
166. George Guttman, IRS Budget Growth Smaller than Desired, Sources Say, 90 TAX
NOTES 1138 (Feb. 26, 2001).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1138 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. Id. Actually, the $125 million cut will be partially offset by $70 million received by
the IRS for user fees.
171. Guttman, supra note 166, at 1138.
172. George Guttman, Administration's Budget Request May Crimp IRS Hiring Plans,




gress put us in place for a specific reason... We hope they listen
to what we say. Then it's up to them to decide."175 Nevertheless,
Mr. Levitan seemed to harbor no illusion that the Oversight Board
would make a difference: "Is it going to make a difference? I don't
know .... I'll be honest with you, the IRS Board's work might
amount to no more than one sentence in the final product.
" 176
The Oversight Board's advocacy did not seem to sway key Re-
publican lawmakers, who argued that OMB's funding was ade-
quate.77 Perhaps most surprising, and instructive, was the re-
sponse of Restructuring Commission member and Finance Com-
mittee chair Senator Grassley:
I appreciate the Oversight Board showing its independence
from the Bush Administration regarding the budget... How-
ever, given that the Oversight Board basically embraced the
IRS's initial proposed budget, I'm worried that the board may
not be showing significant independence from IRS manage-
ment. It's important that the Oversight Board reach its con-
clusions based on a rigorous and thorough review of IRS
budgetary needs.... I look forward to reading the board's jus-
tification for its actions.
178
The budget battle spilled over into the May 2001 joint congres-
sional hearings required under the 1988 Restructuring and Re-
form Act.'79 This was the first joint meeting in which the Over-
sight Board was able to participate due to the delay in seating the
board. Senator Fred Thompson, chair of the Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, continued to present the Bush administration's
position that IRS had received adequate funding, and suggested
that the IRS had wasted previous modernization funding. 8' Mr.
Levitan continued to argue that the $4 million already spent on
175. Amy Hamilton, IRS Oversight Board Prepares for Budget Face-Off, 90 TAX NOTES
1766 (Mar. 26, 2001).
176. Id.
177. Id. "I believe there is a lot of internal repair that can be done to the agency...
where we could get a better performance from the agency within the existing budget." Id.
at 1767 (quoting House Majority Leader Dick Armey).
178. Id. at 1767-68.
179. Congress Wants IRS Modernization Plan to Start Producing Results, 2001 TAX
NOTES 90-2 (May 8, 2001).
180. See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 JCX-33-01,
(May 4, 2001).
181. 2001 TAX NOTES 90-2.
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modernization had not been "wasted."'82 The hearings ended with
a call for the various government agencies involved to try to recon-
cile their differences.
The difficulty of advocating for the funds believed by the Board
to be necessary for running the IRS continues to be problematic.
The budget controversy continued to fester with Commissioner
Rossotti's planned testimony before the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee. The testimony was nominally canceled because of
a scheduling conflict, although it was reported that the Office of
Management and Budget would not approve the testimony be-
cause Rossotti was seeking more money than the administration
was going to request.
83
Commissioner Rossotti announced that he would not be seeking
another term as IRS Commissioner. The IRS Oversight Board
undertook its stautory responsibility to recommend nominees to
succeed Commissioner Rossotti. In addition, the White House re-
portedly performed its own search by hiring a search firm."M One
commentator noted the following: early indicators are that loyalty
to the Bush Administration will be more important in filling the
job than management experience."' The search firm inadvertently
leaked an e-mail that said that the president prefers someone who
is "definitely not a tax attorney and does not need to have any in-
depth exposure.""8  The Oversight Board's two nominees have
thus far languished in the White House despite urging from the
Chairman and ranking minority leader of the senate Finance
Committee. 7  Some argued that instead of seeking a replace-
ment, the Bush administration should have lobbied Rossotti hard
to try to retain him so that he could accomplish the reforms that
he had begun.
182. Id.
183. George Guttman, OMB Halts Rossotti Testimony at W&M Hearing, 97 TAX NOTES
38 (Oct. 7, 2002). "By speaking his mind, Rossotti 'would be going off the reservation,' IRS
sources said." Id.
184. Paul C. Light, Bush Picks Wrong Time for Leadership Change at IRS, SAINT PAUL





187. Amy Hamilton & George Guttman, Finance Leaders Push White House to Nominate
IRS Commissioner, 96 TAx NoTES 1290 (Sept. 2, 2002) (citing letter from Senators Baucus
and Grassley to President Bush, 2002 TNT 168-27).
188. Id.
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In January 2003, President Bush nominated Mark Everson to
the position of IRS Commissioner. '89 Mr. Everson was not one of
the names forwarded by the Oversight Board.' Indeed, Mr. Ever-
son seems to match the criteria leaked to the press earlier: he is
not a tax lawyer, and he is someone who is a Bush loyalist."' Mr.
Everson, who began his career as an auditor for Arthur Andersen,
has background in information technology and management. 9 ' He
has both government and private sector experience. Mr. Everson
served the Reagan administration in the U.S. Information Agency
as well as a special assistant to then Attorney General Edwin
Meese.9  After leaving the Reagan administration, Mr. Everson
served as vice-president of finance for two large corporations.'94
He joined the Bush administration in 2001 as Bush's chief man-
agement officer, focusing on governmental financial management
and technology issues.
The Oversight Board achieved its most significant accomplish-
ment of its young existence when it successfully intervened with
then Commissioner Rossotti on behalf of the National Taxpayer
Advocate.9 6 The Board unanimously recommended a reorganiza-
tion of how appeals from the National Taxpayer Advocate were to
be handled, and Commissioner Rossotti changed the IRS's position
after something of a showdown.'97
Finally, IRS Oversight Board Chair Levitan announced that he
would not seek a second two-year term as Chair. Nancy Killefer
was elected new chair.'98
189. Amy Hamilton, White House Announces Nominee for IRS Commissioner, 98 TAX
NOTES 294 (Jan. 20, 2003).
190. Id.
191. See, Light, supra note 184 and accompanying text.
192. Hamilton, supra note 189 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Mr. Everson's ties to the Bush administration include his wife's position as an asso-
ciate general counsel in the Office of White House Counsel. Amy Hamilton, Nominee for
IRS Commissioner Seeks to Enhance Enforcement, 98 TAX NOTES 1792 (Mar. 24, 2003).
196. Amy Hamilton, IRS Oversight Board Flexes Real Muscle in First Show of Strength,
96 Tax Notes 1688 (Sept. 16, 2002). The National taxpayer Advocate was one of the re-
forms to emerge from the 1998 Act. Id. at 1689.
197. Id. at 1690.
198. George Guttman, Rossotti Gives Oversight Board End-of-Term Report, 96 TAX
NOTES 1819 (Sept. 30, 2002).
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V. APPLYING AND TESTING THE CORPORATE ANALOGY-AN
INTERIM CRITIQUE OF THE IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD FROM A
CORPORATE LAw PERSPECTIVE
In this section, the corporate analogy is explored. First, the
governance structure of the corporation is set forth. The applica-
tion of corporate structure to government is then discussed. Fi-
nally, the application of the corporate analogy to the IRS and its
Oversight Board is examined and critiqued.
A. Corporate Governance Generally
1. Governing the Corporation
The private corporation is one of the basic forms of conducting
business in the United States."' It is a separate legal entity,
which can sue, be sued, and own property. Shareholders own
shares of stock in the corporation, which has traditionally repre-
sented the ownership interest.2 0 Shareholders do not have the
power to manage the corporation. Rather, shareholders elect a
board of directors, which has the power to manage the corpora-
tion.0 1
Directors are elected at the annual meeting of shareholders.2 2
Directors are generally elected by a plurality of all shares entitled
to vote, although certain classes may be allowed to elect one or
more directors.23  The directors may be elected for staggered
terms.2" Directors are removable by the vote of the sharehold-
205ers.
A corporation's board of directors is vested with broad power
and authority:
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the au-
thority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
199. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAw 1
(1999).
200. It has been argued that others have an interest in the corporation as well. Such
stakeholders would include employees, local communities and the environment. A number
of states have enacted "other constituency statutes" which allow the board of directors to
consider the effect on such stakeholders when deciding corporate action.
201. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.01 and 8.04 (1984).
202. Id. at § 8.03(c).
203. Id. at § 8.04.
204. Id. at § 8.06.
205. Id. at § 8.08.
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managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors,
subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorpora-
tion or in an agreement [pursuant to a shareholders agree-
ment].2"
The corporate board of directors, particularly in large publicly-
traded corporations, delegates the day-to-day management of the
corporation to corporate officers." ' In addition, the board of direc-
tors often delegates its own remaining responsibilities to commit-
tees.2 °8
With respect to large publicly traded corporations, the board of
directors typically owns a very small percentage of the corpora-
tion's outstanding stock.29 This leads to a separation of ownership
and control. One of the advantages of such a separation of owner-
ship and control is that capital can be invested in an efficient
manner because stockholders are generally insulated from the
liability of the corporation. On the other hand, the separation of
liability and control has led to a long-standing problem in which
the management of the corporation (officers) acts in ways not in
the best interests of the shareholders.210 This problem of separa-
tion and control arises because of the widely dispersed ownership
of shares of stock which leads to little oversight. This problem has
led to particular focus on the corporate board of directors which
has often been accused of "rubber stamping" the actions of officers.
Among the monitoring devices available to check the separation
of ownership and control is the imposition of the fiduciary duty
lawsuit."' Corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion.212 The fiduciary duties are the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care. The duty of care requires that the board discharge its re-
sponsibilities with the requisite care.2"3 Many directors' actions
fall within the protection of the business judgment rule, which
presumes that the duty of care is met.2 4 Moreover, many states
206. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).
207. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 199, at § 5.06.
208. Id. at § 5.05[A].
209. For example, as a group, the IBM board of directors owns less than one percent of
the corporation's outstanding stock. 1999 IBM Proxy Statement.
210. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1933).
211. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 199, at § 8.01
212. Id.
213. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
214. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d
776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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provide that the corporate charter can eliminate liabilities for
breach of the duty of care .215
The duty of loyalty generally requires that directors put the in-
terests of the corporation ahead of other interests.216 Thus, a di-
rector generally cannot compete against his or her corporation.
2. Selecting the Board of Directors
Corporate law generally does not mandate qualification re-
quirements for corporate directors.2" Although not legally pre-
scribed, the National Association of Corporate Directors (hereinaf-
ter "NACD") established a Blue Ribbon Commission which studied
director professionalism and set forth standards for selecting di-
rectors.218
The NACD's report provides that all corporate directors possess
certain personal characteristics, in addition to satisfying one of
their boards' core competencies. 219 The following personal charac-
teristics should be possessed by corporate board members:
1. Integrity and Accountability;
2. Informed Judgment;
3. Financial Literacy;
4. Mature Confidence; and
5. High Performance Standards.22 °
In addition to satisfying the above personal characteristics, each
board member should fit within one of the following core compe-
tencies and the board as a whole should satisfy all of the core
competencies:
1. Accounting and Finance .... Boards should seek candi-
dates with experience in financial accounting and corporate
215. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003).
216. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
217. Id. at § 8.02.
218. NAT'L ASS'N OF CORP. DIRECTORS, REPORT ON THE NACD BLuE RIBBON COMMN ON
DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM (2001) (hereinafter "NACD Blue Ribbon Report"). The Re-
port's recommendations were based on extensive surveys.
219. Id. at 9-10.
220. Id. at 10.
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finance, especially with respect to trends in debt and equity
markets;
2. Business Judgment .... Boards should seek candidates
who have a record of making good business decisions;
3. Management .... Boards should seek candidates who un-
derstand and stay current on general management best prac-
tices and their application in complex, rapidly evolving busi-
ness environments;
4. Crisis Response .... Boards should have the ability and
time to perform during periods of both short-term and pro-
longed crises;
5. Industry Knowledge .... Each company's board should
have one or more members with appropriate and relevant in-
dustry-specific knowledge;
6. International Markets .... Boards of companies that op-
erate or plan to operate in international markets should seek
candidates who have business experience in those markets;
7. Leadership .... Boards should seek candidates who un-
derstand and possess empowerment skills and who have a
history of motivating high-performing talent;
8. Strategy/ision .... Boards should seek candidates with
the skills and capacity to provide strategic insight and direc-
tion by encouraging innovation, conceptualizing key trends,
evaluating strategic decisions, and continuously challenging
the organization to sharpen its vision. 221
3. Recent Corporate Scandals and Corporate Governance
Commentators have long challenged whether the corporate
board of directors actually governs corporations, or whether it is
largely a rubber stamp for the chief executive officer, who is often
the chairman of the board. The governance of corporations has
come under fire recently in light of the corporate scandals involv-
ing Enron Corporation and others. Enron was once an "old-line
energy company" that had transitioned itself into a "high tech
221. Id. at 10-11.
IRS, Inc. 755
Duquesne Law Review
global company" that traded in exotic energy contracts and ex-
panded into new industries.222 Enron collapsed into bankruptcy in
December 2001.223 At the time it declared bankruptcy, Enron was
regarded to be the nation's seventh largest corporation, with gross
revenues exceeding $100 billion and a worldwide organization of
more than 20,000 employees. 224 The collapse of Enron profoundly
affected the nation and economy:
The bankruptcy sent shock waves throughout the country, both
on Wall Street and Main Street where over half of American fami-
lies now invest directly or indirectly in the stock market. Thou-
sands of Enron employees lost not only their jobs but a significant
part of their retirement. Enron shareholders saw the value of
their investments plummet; and hundreds, if not thousands, of
businesses around the world were turned into Enron creditors in
bankruptcy court likely to receive only pennies on the dollars owed
to them.25
Enron's sudden collapse was fueled by numerous accounting ir-
regularities and undisclosed dealings with companies controlled
by Enron executives.226 Much of the blame for Enron's failure was
attributed to a lack of oversight by the Enron Board of Directors.227
Indeed, the Senate report on the Enron Directors offers an array
of alleged failures by Enron directors.228
As a result of the Enron scandal and others, reform of corporate
governance has emerged. 229  The Conference Board recently con-
vened a prestigious, independent commission to address govern-
222. The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's Collapse: Rept. Prepared by the Per-
manent Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 2d sess. 6
(2002) (hereinafter "Senate Report on Enron Directors").
223. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 6
225. Id. at 1.
226. Id at 11.
227. Senate Report on Enron Directors, supra note 222, at 3.
228. The Senate report alleged that the Enron directors violated their fiduciary duties in
five different ways: (1) by allowing Enron to "engage in high risk accounting practices;" (2)
by approving of numerous inappropriate conflicts of interest which allowed the company
Chief Financial Officer to transact business with the company at its expense; (3) by allow-
ing Enron to make its financial condition appear better than it was by its substantial "off-
the-books activity;" (4) by approving excess compensation and failure to monitor a company
financed personal credit line for the chairman and chief executive officer; and (5) allowing
for a lack of independence among certain board members and the company and for allowing
for the company's auditor, Andersen to provide internal auditing and other consulting
services while acting as the company's auditor. Id. at 3.
The outside Enron directors commissioned their own report of the corporation's
collapse. That report absolves the outside directors of fault.
229. Carol Hymowitz, How to Fix a Broken System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at B1.
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ance issues arising from the corporate scandals."' The Conference
Board Commission found that the recent scandals had signifi-
cantly weakened the trust of the general public and investors in
the American system of corporate governance.231 The Commission
cited polls that focus on the lack of independent oversight of the
board of directors as a continuing theme:
The Commission is profoundly troubled by the corporate scan-
dals in the recent past. The primary concern in many of these
situations is that strong CEO's appear to have exerted a dominant
influence over their boards, after stifling the efforts of directors to
play the central oversight role needed to insure a healthy system
of corporate governance. In such circumstances, boards have ei-
ther lacked the structure and information to perform their roles
properly, or they have simply abdicated their responsibilities to
provide the oversight required of them.232
Among its reform proposals, the Conference Board Commission
addressed the role of the dual chief executive officer and chairman
of the board. The Commission found that a balancing between the
board and senior management needs to exist. Although such a
balancing need not be adversarial in most situations, the man-
agement functions of senior executives and the oversight functions
of the board are necessarily distinct.233 Because the chief executive
officer is the head of the management team, a potential conflict
exists with the board's responsibility of oversight over the com-
pany.' Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the posi-
tions of chief executive officer and chairman of the board be filled
by different individuals.235 Furthermore, the Commission pro-
posed that the chairman be an independent, or outside, director.236
The Conference Board Commission also went beyond a reform
proposal made by the New York Stock exchange and proposed a
230. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS PART 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PART 3: AUDIT
AND ACCOUNTING 2 (2003), available at http://www.conference-board.org. The twelve mem-
bers of the commission included such corporate dignitaries as now Secretary of Treasury
and the Chairman and CEO of CSX, Inc.; former president and CEO of TIAA-CREF John
Biggs; founder and chairman of Vanguard Group, Inc. John Bogle; former SEC Chairman
Arther Levitt, Jr.; and former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Paul Volker. Id. at 2.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 18.
233. Id. at 18-19.
234. Id. at 19.
235. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 230, at 19.
236. Id.
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"significant majority" of directors be independent, or outside, di-
rectors.2?
B. Blending Government Function and Corporate Governance
1. Government Corporations Generally
The corporate form of business and governance does in fact exist
in the federal government. The federal government has long used
"Government Corporations" as a way of providing services to citi-
zens.2" Government Corporations have been described as follows:
The distinguishing characteristic of the government corporation
in the American context is that it is an agency of government, es-
tablished by Congress to perform a public purpose which provides
a market-oriented service and produces revenue that meets or ap-
proximates its expenditures.239
The advantages of using a government corporation are their
flexibility and responsiveness. Government corporations are of-
ten designed to follow a business program and are allowed greater
autonomy and flexibility by being relieved of certain governmental
restrictions.2 0
Although government corporation participation in government
activity dates back to the early 1800's, more wide-spread use be-
gan at the beginning of the twentieth century with the U.S. gov-
ernment's purchase of the Panama Railroad Company as well as
corporations set up to support the build-up for World War I."1
237. Id. at 16 n.20 (citing proposed amendments to Sec. 303A of he New York Stock
Exchange Listing Standards).
238. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MANAGING THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS ix, 1 (1995) (hereinafter "CRS Report on Government Corpo-
rations"); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: PROFILE OF
EXISTING CORPORATIONS 3 (1995) (hereinafter "GAO Report on Government Corporations").
239. CRS Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at xi.
240. [Government Corporations are] established... to carry out business-type programs
that need more autonomy and flexibility than that provided by a conventional government
agency structure. Accordingly, [Government Corporations] may be, but are not always,
excepted in part, or in full, from certain federal statutes governing matters such as civil
service pay scales and hiring rules, position ceilings, and procurement. These exceptions
are intended to allow [Government Corporations] to respond more quickly to changes in the
marketplace and, in some cases, to take advantage of cost saving opportunities.
GAO Report on Government Corporationst, supra note 238, at 8.
241. CRS Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at 1-2 (citing as examples
the Legal Services Corporation and Corporation for National and Community Service).
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Government Corporations are generally authorized pursuant to
the Government Corporation Control Act. 42 Broadly considered,
Government Corporations consist of traditionally defined Gov-
ernment Corporations and "quasi government" corporations.2"
The Government Corporations as of 1995 were:
1. Commodity Credit Corporation
2. Community Development Financial Institutions Fund
3. Corporation for National and Community Service
4. Corporation for Public Broadcasting
5. Export-Import Bank
6. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
7. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
8. Federal Financing Bank
9. Federal Prison Industries
10. Government National Mortgage Association
11. Legal Services Corporation
12. National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity
Facility
13. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK)
14. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
15. Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation
16. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
17. Resolution Trust Corporation
18. Rural Telephone Bank
19. St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
242. 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9110. The statute is a codification and technical repeal of the
original Government Corporation Control Act of 1945. CRS Report on Government Corpo-
rations, supra note 238, at 5.
243. CRS Report of Government Corporations, supra note 238, at xi-xii.
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20. Securities Investor Protection Corporation
21. Tennessee Valley Authority
22. United States Enrichment Corporation
23. United States Postal Service 4
In addition, as of 1995, quasi-government enterprises include:
Federal National Mortgage Association, RAND Corporation, Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Manpower Research Demonstration
Corporation, National Endowment for Democracy, Small Business
Investment Companies, and American Red Cross.245
The interest in Government Corporations was rekindled in the
1990's.246 The resulting debate focused on the proper use of Gov-
ernment Corporations. One criticism has been that Government
Corporations include corporations that have no commercial pur-
pose and no revenue raising capacity.247 Moreover, there is con-
cern that the use of the Government Corporation form is being
used to avoid "financial and political accountability" as well as
statutory requirements.2
2. The Postal Service By Comparison
The United States Postal Service (hereinafter "USPS) 249 serves
as an example for board governance structures of Government
Corporations. The USPS provides postal service to the country
and is governed by an eleven member Board of Governors. 2 ° The
Board of Governors is comprised of nine governors, the Postmaster
General and the Deputy Postmaster General.251 The nine gover-
244. CRS Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at 79. Because the des-
ignation of Government Corporations under the working definition is in part self-reporting,
the GAO came up with a list of 22 Government Corporations. GAO Report on Government
Corporations, supra note 238, at 7.
245. CRS Report on Government Corporationt, supra note 238, at xii (citations omitted).
246. See generally, GAO Report on Government Corporationt, supra note 238; CRS Re-
port on Government Corporations, supra note 238.
247. CRS Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at xi.
248. CRS Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at xi-xii.
249. The Congressional Research Service lists the Postal Service as a Government Cor-
poration while the General Accounting Office lists it as a federally funded enterprise (i.e., a
quasi-government corporation). GAO Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238,
at 178 n.5. In any event, it is appropriately considered a Government Corporation under
the broad view taken by this article.
250. 39 U.S.C. § 101(a). See generally, GAO Report on Government Corporations, supra
note 238, at 178-83.
251. GAO Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at 178.
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nors are presidentially appointed with the advice and consent of
the Senate.25 2 Of the nine governors, no more than five governors
can be from the same political party.253 The nine governors elect a
chairman and appoint the Postmaster General, who is also a
member of the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors has
the power to dismiss the Postmaster General and set terms for his
or her pay and service.255 The Governing Board also appoints the
Deputy Postmaster General, who is the eleventh member of the
Board of Governors.
The autonomy and power of the Postal Service Board of Gover-
nors manifested itself in a victorious showdown with President
George H.W. Bush during the waning days of his presidency.256 In
that case, a controversy arose between the Postal Service's Gov-
erning Board and another independent agency, the Postal Rate
Commission, over a rate increase set by the Postal Rate Commis-
sion.
C. Testing the Corporate Analogy: IRS, Inc. and Some Early
Thoughts on the IRS Oversight Board
1. Does the Corporate Analogy Fit?
a. The IRS is not Sears and Roebuck
As a threshold matter, the corporate analogy for the IRS Over-
sight Board must be examined. During the Senate's Oversight
Hearing, Senator Kerrey observed the obvious-the IRS is not
Sears and Roebuck. 257 From the outset, this seemed clear. The
IRS is a governmental agency which discharges the vital function
of collecting the revenue with which the funding is sustained.
Sears is a multinational corporation with diversified retail and
financial services. More importantly, the IRS' mission is to serve
the American taxpayer and fairly administer the tax system.258 On
252. GAO Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at 178.
253. GAO Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at 179.
254. GAO Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238 at 179.
255. GAO Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at 179.
256. Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1935 (1994).
257. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Sears is used as an example for obvious
reasons although any large, publicly-traded corporation would support the same analysis.
Because many of the events in the formation of the IRS Oversight Board took place in 2000,
that year is used for the Sears' governance and financial information for comparative pur-
poses.
258. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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the other hand, Sears exists, either exclusively or to a great ex-
tent, to maximize the wealth of its shareholders.259
Despite these differences, the two organizations have a number
of things in common. Both are very large organizations in terms
of personnel. In 2000, the IRS had just under 100,000 employ-
ees,2 ° and Sears had over 300,000 employees.261 In terms of reve-
nue, the IRS generates far more than Sears. The IRS collects $1.7
trillion in tax revenue262 while Sears' 2000 revenue was just under
$41 billion.262
As to governance, the IRS has its senior executives, the IRS
Oversight Board, Department of Treasury and Congress. Sears
has its senior executives and the following nine person board of
directors:
Alan J. Lacy Chairman of the Board; President and Chief
Executive Officer, Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Hall Adams, Jr. former Chairman and CEO, Leo Burness
Company (also a director of Moody's Corporation and
McDonalds Corporation).
Brenda C. Barnes former president and CEO, Pepsi-Cola
North America (also a director of Avon Products, Inc., Lucas
Digital Ltd. and Lucas Arts Entertainment Company, The
New York Times Company, and TyCom, Ltd.).
Warren L. Batts former Chairman and CEO of Tupperware
Corporation and Premark International, Inc. (also a director
of The Allstate Corporation, Cooper Industries, Inc., and
Sprint Corporation).
James R. Cantalupo Vice-Chairman and President,
McDonalds Corporation (also a director of McDonalds Corpo-
ration, Rohm & Haas Co., the Chicago Council of Foreign Re-
lations, and the Mid-America Committee).
259. To some degree, a long-standing debate exists among commentators as to whether a
corporation exists solely to maximize the wealth of its shareholders or whether other pur-
poses such as social responsibility may also exist.
260. THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REFERENCE ALMANAC, available at
http://www.polisci.com/almanac/exec/treasury/01606.htm.
261. 2000 SEC FORM 10-K, 8, available at
http:///www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/...25601500010/cleanfinallO-k2000.htm.
262. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS ORGANIZATION BLUEPRINT 2000, 1-1, available at
http://www.publish.no.irs.gov.
263. SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co.. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2001).
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W. James Farrell Chairman and CEO Illinois Tool Works,
Inc. (also a director of Illinois Tool Works, Inc., The Allstate
Corporation, The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and the
Quaker Oats Company).
Michael A. Milesformer Chairman and CEO, Phillip Morris
Companies, Inc. (also a director of The Allstate Corporation,
AMR Corporation, AOL Time Warner, Community Health
Systems, Dell Computer Corporation, Exult, Inc., The Inter-
public Group of Companies, and Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter
& Co.).
Hugh G. Price President and CEO, National Urban League
(also director of Educational Testing Service, Mayo Clinic
Foundation, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and Veri-
zon Communication).
Dorothy A. Terrell President, services group, and Vice-
President, worldwide sales, Natural MicroSystems Corpora-
tion (also a director of General Mills, Inc. and Herman Miller,Inc. ). 2"
As reflected in the foregoing, the Sears board of directors is pri-
marily made up of experienced chief executive officers (and for-
mer CEOs) who have vast experience in managing large organiza-
tions as well as serving on other corporate boards. Perhaps this is
the kind of dream team board of directors that the National Com-
mission envisioned. The appointed members of the IRS Oversight
Board, while highly accomplished in their own right, do not ap-
pear to have backgrounds that are predominant on boards of large
corporations. Indeed, the backgrounds appear to be better suited
to render management consulting advice or legal advice rather
than overall governance.
In addition to the differences as to directors' backgrounds and
qualifications, the power of the boards greatly differs. The Sears
board retains the ultimate legal power to govern the corporation.
Thus, the Sears board has the ultimate approval of the corporate
budget. Moreover, the Sears board possesses the power to enact
broad policy shifts with respect to corporate business. When the
chief executive officer of Sears is replaced, the board will select a
successor. Finally, Sears directors face potential liability in the
264. SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co.. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 49 (2001).
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event that a breach of the fiduciary duty of care or duty of loyalty
is found.
The IRS Oversight Board plays a more discrete, and limited,
role in the governance of the IRS. Instead of broadly overseeing
the core business of the enterprise-i.e., administering the coun-
try's tax system-it is proscribed by statute from making decisions
as to tax policy and administration,2  which is arguably the core
business of the IRS. Instead, the Board's power rests with advis-
ing on narrower, albeit important, issues such as budgeting, op-
erational and strategic areas. Indeed, in recommending tax sim-
plification, the Board's recent Annual Report reflected the obvious
statutory limitations on its authority:
The Board does not endorse any particular proposal for tax
code simplification, nor should it, but feels obligated to re-
mind congress that tax code complexity impedes sound ad-
ministration and adds to enforcement difficulty. . . . The
Board urges congress to consider complexity issues as part of
every tax bill, and encourages it to make tax code simplifica-
tion a theme of future legislation."'
And unlike the Sears board of directors, which has the power to
hire and fire the chief executive officer, the IRS Oversight Board
has a much more limited role with respect to the IRS' chief execu-
tive officer, the IRS Commissioner. The IRS Oversight Board
merely has the power to recommend removal of the Commissioner
as well as to provide recommendations to the President on candi-
dates for appointing a new Commissioner. 267 At the time of the
National Restructuring Commission's study, it was contemplated
that the Oversight Board might have the power to appoint and
compensate the Commissioner. The issue as to whether it would
be a violation of the Constitution for the Oversight Board to have
the power to appoint the IRS Commissioner itself was unsettled.
26
8
265. Act. Sec. 1001.
266. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003), available at
www.irsoversightboard.treas.gov.
267. See generally I.R.C. 7800 et seq.
268. See Congressional Research Service Memorandum to the National Commission on
Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service (dated June 4, 1997), reprinted in JOINT COMM.
ON TAX., DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ON
ExECuTIvE BRANCH GOVERNANCE AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT Appendix B (JCX-44-
97). The Congressional Research Service considered three issues: (1) whether the Over-
sight Board would be within the administrative structuring powers of Congress; (2)
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b. The IRS is not a Government Corporation
The corporate board model of governance has long been used for
Government Corporations and quasi-government corporations. At
present, Government Corporations and quasi-government corpora-
261tions provide market oriented services or business programs.
Types of activity include: furthering home ownership; developing
federally funded research; and providing nonprofit intermediar-
270ies.
Some Government Corporations or quasi-government corpora-
tions have direct or indirect commercial competition. For exam-
ple, the United States Postal Service competes, to some extent,
with United Parcel Service, Federal Express, and the Internet.
The IRS does not fit within the types of government function
governed as a Government Corporation or quasi-government cor-
poration. Although some of the IRS' activities are certainly able to
be privatized,2 ' the IRS provides an inherently governmental
function. The tax system provides the financial lifeblood of the
government. In administering the tax law, the IRS is privy to
privileged and confidential information about the nations taxpay-
ers. Moreover, unlike Government Corporations or quasi-
government corporations such as the Postal Service, the IRS has
no commercial competition.
Assuming, arguendo, that the IRS could fit within a Govern-
ment Corporation or quasi-government corporation framework,
the existing structure for the IRS Oversight Board falls far short
by comparison to other Boards-e.g., the Postal Service Board of
Governors-in terms of power and autonomy. For example, the
Postal Service Board of Governors has the direct power to select
and remove the Postmaster General, i.e., C.E.O. In addition, the
Postal Service Board of Governors succeeded in its showdown
against a sitting U.S. President.
The IRS Oversight Board, on the other hand, merely has advis-
ing and recommending powers as to selecting the IRS Commis-
whether the IRS Commissioner is an "inferior officer;" and (3) whether the Oversight Board
would be a "Head of Department" capable of appointing inferior officers. Id. at 2. The
Congressional Research Service opined that it was "likely" that a reviewing court would
hold that a structure of the Oversight Board appointing the Commissioner would pass
constitutional muster. Id.
269. See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text.
270. CRS Report on Government Corporations, supra note 238, at xii.
271. For example, the IRS is considering privatizing its debt collection activity. Amy
Hamilton, IRS Considers Private Debt Collections, 95 TAX NOTES 478 (Apr. 22, 2002).
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sioner. This power will be observed in the near future as the
White House considers the Board's recommendation for the suc-
cessor to Commissioner Rossotti. In another statutorily author-
ized area, reviewing and advocating for the IRS budget, the Over-
sight Board has thus far largely been ignored by the White House
and Congress. 72
c. Is the Board Model Effective?
Perhaps the issue of corporate analogy ultimately rests on the
question of whether the governing board is an appropriate form of
governance mechanism in the first place. Or perhaps the corpo-
rate board analogy is applicable and large corporate boards, in
effect, have no more power than the IRS Oversight Board. The
recent financial implosion of the Enron Corporation has renewed
long-standing criticisms of the effectiveness of the corporate board
of directors as an effective governance method. One criticism fo-
cuses on the separation of ownership and control, that is, the in-
terest of the managers, including the insider directors, was not
aligned with that of the shareholders. Additionally, corporate
boards of directors have long been criticized for following a coun-
try club model of selecting predominately white male chief execu-
tive officers and board members.
Although the IRS clearly is not Sears, the IRS Oversight Board
reflects some of the post-Enron corporate reform measures.273 For
example, the statutory structure mandates that the chairman of
the Board be an outside member. 274 Thus, the Board meets the
proposed reform of separation of roles of the chairman and chief
executive officer (IRS Commissioner).275 Moreover, with its seven
outside members (six private plus the designated federal em-
ployee), the board is comprised of a substanial majority of inde-
pendent or outside directors. The board members are not effec-
tively chosen by the current CEO/Chairman to entrench his or her
position but are instead chosen for specific backgrounds and tasks
that tailor into the goals of the board and IRS. Finally, by serving
272. In an op-ed piece, Professor Paul Krugman suggests that the failure of the Bush
White House and corporate activists to truly support corporate reform is analogous to the
long-standing under-funding of the IRS. Paul Krugman, Business as Usual, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2002 electronic edition).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 83-102.
274. See I.R.C. § 7800 et seq.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 83-102.
766 Vol. 42
Summer 2004
five year staggered terms (once phased-in), the board members are
276more aligned with longer term interests.
The use of the corporate model of governance in the government
sector has been particularly criticized. The nonpartisan Congres-
sional Research Service warned about a blanket application of
corporate management to the public sector:
Much of the public management literature today accepts the
premise that the governmental and private sectors are similar in
their fundamentals, and hence respond similarly to management
incentives and processes. [The CSR's study] advances and explores
a very different premise: that the governmental and private sec-
tors are dissimilar in their fundamentals and hence respond dis-
similarly to management incentives and processes. As [was] ob-
served some years ago, the public and private sectors are alike in
the nonessentials, differing only in the essentials. And the essen-
tials for a government corporation are to be found in public law,
not in economics or sociology. The management of the executive
branch is not like the management of General Electric or the Ritz-
Carlton Hotels except in the nonessentials.277
In recommending congressional rejection of the board structure
in lieu of an executive director for governing the Social Security
Administration, the nonpartisan General Accounting Office (here-
inafter "GAO") observed that:
Our work-and the work of others that we have reviewed-
suggests, however, that, in practice, the board form of organi-
zation has not proven effective in providing stable leadership,
in insulating decisions from political pressures, and in assur-
ing that diverse viewpoints are considered in the decision-
making process. In the regulatory agencies that we have
studied, we have concluded that a single administrator would
provide more effective and stable leadership than a board. In
our view, the need for stable and effective leadership is more
critical in the management of an organization the size and
complexity of the [Social Security Administration] than it is in
276. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenbaum, A New System of Corporate Governance:
The QuinQuennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 202,202-03 (1991).




the management of the relatively small regulatory agencies
that we have reviewed .
The GAO concluded that a policy advisory board would address
the need to provide bipartisan input for the Social Security Ad-
ministration.279 When reduced to its essentials, the IRS Oversight
Board actually more represents an advisory board than a govern-
ing board.
2. The IRS Oversight Board-Effective Reform or Just Poli-
tics?
a. The IRS Oversight Board-A Misnomer?
In structure and reality, the IRS Oversight Board is much more
of an advisory board than a governing board analogous to either a
private or government corporation board of directors. At one level,
the term "oversight" and board of directors rhetoric might suggest
a benign misnomer-i.e., a mere semantic difference. Addition-
ally, there is no question that the IRS could benefit from input
from the private sector and other constituencies. Indeed, a policy
advisory board has been suggested as reform for other federal
agencies like the Social Security Administration.
There have been a number of different advisory boards in exis-
tence at the IRS, such as the former Commissioners' Advisory
Group. Indeed, the Oversight Board initially had funding issues
with respect to other advisory boards-the IRS Management
Board and the IRS Citizens Advocacy Panel.2"' The IRS Oversight
Board is different because its private life members are appointed
by the president and the board has a broader, albeit statutorily
delineated, scope of responsibility.
As to the misnomer, perhaps Congress is simply following a
trend. An oversight board has been a fairly common response of
late to perceived high profile organizational failures in the gov-
ernment and private sector. For example, the FBI has been under
a review commission as a response to the embarrassing revela-
tions resulting from the arrest and guilty plea of counter-
278. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: LEADERSHIP
STRUCTURE FOR AN INDEPENDENT SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (GAO/HRD-89-154) 1-
2 (1989) (hereinafter "GAO Report on Social Security Administration") (footnotes omitted).
279. GAO Report on Social Security Administration, supra note 278, at 2.
280. George Guttman, Is the IRS Stiffing its Oversight Board? 89 TAx NOTES 846 (Nov.
10, 2000).
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intelligence agent Robert Hanssen." In addition, the consulting
and auditing firm of Andersen set up an oversight board headed
by former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker. The
Andersen oversight committee was set up in response to the alle-
gations of corporate misconduct by Andersen in the Enron debacle
(Andersen was the Enron auditor).
In response to corporate accounting scandals at Enron and
WorldCom, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 82  Chief
among the reform measures was the creation of a new Accounting
Oversight Board to oversee the accounting industry. The Account-
ing Oversight Board was to be appointed by the Securities Ex-
change Commission. A controversy soon ensued over the ap-
pointment of the first chair of the Board. SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt pulled his support for TIAA-CREF chief executive officer John
Biggs, who was believed to be a tough proponent of accounting and
auditing reform. Pitt ultimately resigned after his selection, for-
mer Federal Judge, FBI director and CIA Director, William Web-
ster, became embroiled in a new controversy over his prior service
on the auditing committee of a publicy traded company which was
subject to charges of accounting irregularities.283 A subsequent
investigation by the General Accounting Office suggested that the
controversy over the lack of disclosure came from a breakdown in
the process caused by trying to meet a very short statutory dead-
line.'
b. Ineffective Reform is Bad Tax Policy
If the IRS Oversight Board is not really a governing oversight
board, is there a resulting policy harm? The answer may well be
yes because the IRS has long suffered negative perceptions in the
eyes of the taxpaying public. This negative perception is exacer-
bated by the politicians' use of the IRS as a scapegoat for what ails
the U.S. tax system.
281. Philip Shenon, A Former Insider Returns to Investigate the Investigators, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at A9.
282. 107 Pub. L. No. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 36 U.
CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). Professor Cunningham observes that "a soberly apolitical view
sees the Act as more sweep than reform.. . . " Id. at 917.
283. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.'s Embattled Chief Resigns in Wake of Latest Political
Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6 2002, available at www.nytimes.com.
284. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO IMPROVE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD SELECTION
PROCESS 4 (2002 GAO-03-339).
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To the extent that the IRS Oversight Board is not a true govern-
ing board, it can hardly be considered an effective reform. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that taxpayers were led to be-
lieve that a corporate type of board of directors was imposed on
the IRS.
Thus, the Oversight Board appears to be merely a political pla-
cebo. At least superficially, the Board was created with the veneer
of reform. The Board, with its seven private life members, reflects
a measure of independence from both the IRS and its parent, the
Department of Treasury. This veneer of reform disappears, how-
ever, upon further examination of the actual power granted and
the process with which the first board was seated. Indeed, the
selection and confirmation process reflected an administration not
interested in really seating a board285 and a senate not really in-
terested in confirming the board. This lack of interest was pre-
dicted by another commentator:
The new IRS Oversight Board was slow in materializing....
With many of its operational details yet to be ironed out, in-
cluding the Board's delicate relationship with the commis-
sioner and Treasury officials, its future role is far from clear.
The Clinton Administration's unhurried approach to getting
the Board up and running suggests problems, especially in
light of the Administrations initial reluctance to support the
Oversight Board during legislative debate over the reform
bill. Whether the Bush Administration will manifest a differ-
ent attitude toward the board remains to be seen, but to date
the panel has been little more than a paper creation.
A new president of a different political party... is now in office
and appears to be little concerned with the board appointed by his
predecessor.
Ironically, public perception of the IRS has improved. Then-
Commissioner Rossotti recently reported significant improvement
in customer satisfaction:
I am pleased to report, with respect to the [2001] filing sea-
son, that we are, I believe, improving performance across the
285. The administration being referenced refers to the Clinton Administration.
286. Joseph J. Thorndike, Reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service: Reforming the
Internal Revenue: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 778.
287. Republican President George W. Bush.
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board; and I think it is important to note that over the last
few years our improvement in performance has been recog-
nized by the most important judge of our performance, which
is the American public....
I don't mean to put too much focus just on surveys, but I do
believe that the public's rating of the IRS is fundamentally
important to the health of the tax system."
The credit for the improvement was directed to Commissioner
Rossotti and not the IRS Oversight Board.:
The Commissioner has transformed it from an outdated struc-
ture based on geography into a modest customer-focused agency
organized around the tax needs of American Citizens. He also laid
the groundwork for technological changes that will carry the IRS
into the 21st Century. We are just beginning to see the fruits of
those innovations today.289
Notwithstanding the perceived improvement in the IRS, its
most significant hurdles still remain. As his term neared comple-
tion, Commissioner Rossotti reported to the Oversight Board.
First, the IRS stills needs to be adequately funded in order to ac-
complish its reform goals. Second, the problem of tax cheats, such
as corporate tax shelters, remain an enormous problem.290
In an interview at the end of his tenure, Commissioner Rossotti
noted that the level of oversight by the IRS Oversight Board and
others has the potential to provide a distraction from the IRS'
main function:
Distraction is still an issue today .... Six congressional com-
mittees have official oversight of the IRS; Rossotti has testi-
fied at 48 congressional hearings since becoming Commis-
sioner. Then there is the IRS Oversight Board, to which the
IRS is accountable. And Treasury. And Treasury's Inspector
General for Tax Administration, which makes the IRS an
agency with its very own inspector general. Then there is the
288. 2002 Tax Return Filing season and the IRS Budget for Fiscal Year 2003: Hearing
before the Subomm. On Oversight of the Comm. On Ways and Means, 107th Cong 2d Sess.
(2002) (statement of Commissioner Charles Rossotti) (hereinafter "Ways and Means Hear-
ings on 2002 Filing Season").
289. Ways and Means Hearings on 2002 Filing Season, supra note 288 (statement of
Chairman Houghton).
290. George Guttman, Rossotti Attacks Tax Cheats in End-of-Tenure Report, 96 TAX




Office of Management and Budget. And the General Account-
ing Office. In total, these entities produce 250 Audit Reports
of the IRS each year-or one for each business day.29" '
To date, the Oversight Board has largely been ignored by Con-
gress and the Clinton and Bush White Houses. The Oversight
Board continues to fall under criticism for not being sufficiently
independent of the IRS. Senate Finance Chair, and former mem-
ber of the Restructuring Commission, Senator Charles Grassley
"excoriated the leadership of the IRS Board" as being advocates
for the IRS rather than independent:
I worry that the board, particularly under the current leader-
ship, forgets its mission .... I worry that the board forgets its
role is not to echo IRS management, not to obscure, obfuscate,
or otherwise provide cover for IRS actions, but to keep a
watchful eye on a very powerful and very important
292agency...
Indeed, Senator Grassley again voiced his criticisms of the lack
of independence by the Oversight Board: "Inbreeding is not what
we want. . . . I'm not sure that people inside the Treasury see the
Oversight Board as being as independent as we set it up to be."
293
The Bush White House conducted its own parallel search proc-
ess to choose a Bush loyalist to replace Commissioner Rossotti.24
In doing so, neither of the Oversight Board's recommendations
were selected and presumably were never seriously considered.
Finally, a recent meeting of the Oversight Board reflected the
effects of turnover within the Bush economic team and delay in
filling the IRS Commissioner's post and Oversight Board vacan-
cies: "[W]ith two vacancies, one member absent, and two attending
in acting capacity, only four bona fide members . . . attended the
meeting.""' In hearings on two nominees for Treasury positions,
Senator Grassley again repeated his concern. Senator Grassley
291. Amy Hamilton, Rossotti Reflects on His Tenure as IRS Reform Commissioner, 96
TAX NOTES 1178, 1179 (2002).
292. Amy Hamilton, Grassley Sharply Criticizes IRS Oversight Board, 98 TAX NOTES
1049 (Feb. 17, 2003)
293. Amy Hamilton, IRS Oversight Board Subject to "Inbreeding-Grassley Says," 100
TAX NOTES 615 (2003)
294. See Paul C. Light, supra note 282 and accompanying text; Amy Hamilton, supra
note 293 and accompanying text.
295. George Guttman, IRS Oversight Board Divided on Outsourcing, 2003 TNT 55-4
(Mar. 21, 2003).
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had placed a hold on the Bush administration's Treasury nomi-
nees until the White House acceded to him by nominating IRS




Taxes have always been unpopular. As the government's direct
representative in the inherently unpopular task of taxation, the
IRS has long been under attack. These attacks and criticisms
reached a crescendo with the hearings leading up to the IRS Re-
structuring and Reform Act of 1998. Those hearings drew signifi-
cant public attention by highlighting allegations of IRS abuse of
taxpayers, much of which were later disproved with little public
attention. Nevertheless, the scrutiny of those hearings did reveal
other serious problems with the IRS, such as large scale ineffi-
ciency and lack of cohesive strategic planning. One of the most
heralded reforms was the creation of a corporate style board of
directors to oversee the IRS.
Unfortunately, the corporate analogy is misplaced. Senator
Kerrey was certainly right-"the IRS is not Sears and Roebuck."
29
Although there are some similarities, obvious differences exist
between an inherently essential governmental agency and a for-
profit publicly held enterprise. On the surface, the IRS Oversight
Board resembles a reformed, post-Enron Board of Directors. Its
members are supposed to be selected on enumerated qualifica-
tions, targeted to specific tasks. The chair's position is separated
from that of the chief executive officer. In addition, the board is
comprised of a majority of outside members, whose terms are
staggered and long enough for a longer vision of the organization.
Despite its outward appearance, the Oversight Board simply
does not have the plenary power granted to a corporate board. It
does not have the ultimate power to set strategy. Rather, it
merely advises. Unlike a corporation, the Oversight Board merely
recommends nominees for its company's chief executive officer. To
date, the Oversight Board's recommendations have been largely
ignored as it has been accused of not being independent of the
IRS.
296. Id.
297. 1998 Senate IRS Oversight Hearings, supra note 1, at 7.
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Rather than a governance mechanism, the Oversight Board
seems to be a statutorily created advisory board, appointments to
which are intensely political. But this does not comport with the
reform rhetoric urged on taxpayers. And to the extent that the
failed analogy undermines public confidence in the IRS, it under-
mines confidence in the tax system, which results in bad tax pol-
icy.
